By Kelfala Lebbie
Sierra Leone’s governance challenge goes beyond the people who occupy public office.
Kelfala Lebbie argues that excessive centralisation weakens local accountability and calls for a major transfer of public functions, funding and responsibility to district authorities.
Every few years, Sierra Leoneans choose between two major parties, yet the daily realities facing many communities remain stubbornly familiar. A school may still lack a roof. A clinic may still lack reliable power.
A road to a district headquarters may become impassable when the rains arrive.
We interpret these failures as a problem of personnel and return to the ballot box hoping that different people will produce a different country.The problem, however, is not only who holds office. It is also how the state is organised.
Sierra Leone has long concentrated important decisions and resources in Freetown, leaving communities far from the capital dependent on decisions made elsewhere. When too much authority passes through the centre, delivery can become slow, politicised and difficult for citizens to scrutinise.
Corruption is not inevitable, but systems that concentrate discretion and weaken local accountability can make abuse harder to detect and challenge.
The reform that deserves serious public debate is therefore structural: substantially reduce the functions performed by central government and transfer appropriate responsibilities, funding and accountability to district authorities.
The Ministry of Finance does not need layers of political officeholders for their own sake.
Freetown should not have to approve every classroom project in Pujehun or every borehole in Koinadugu. Education delivery, local planning, primary healthcare, water and other community services should be managed as close to residents as practicable, with predictable funding and clear performance obligations.
The centre would retain responsibilities that genuinely require national coordination: setting standards, redistributing resources, investigating corruption, coordinating national policy and building the highways, railways and power infrastructure that connect Kono’s farmers with Bo’s markets and the wider economy. It should also publish comparable results for every district so citizens can see how their councils perform. A smaller centre should mean sharper accountability, not a weaker state.
Sierra Leone should also reconsider the frequency and rationale of changes to district boundaries. The country’s administrative structure has expanded from 16 districts to 18 following the gazetting of Bandajuma and Kpanguima districts in September 2026.
The author’s proposal is to consolidate the map around a smaller number of viable provincial districts and the Western Area, rather than continue creating new units. Any such proposal requires careful technical work and public consultation.
No district should be created, dissolved or materially redrawn without transparent criteria, reliable census data, consultation with affected communities and an appropriate democratic approval process.
An independent commission should publish the formula used to draw boundaries.Why does this matter for national politics? Because a single national election can determine who controls a large share of public appointments, contracts and spending across the country.
That can make politics feel existential: losing an election can feel like losing access to the state. Stronger local government would not remove national political competition, but it could give communities more direct influence over services and make local performance easier to compare.
At community level, the question should be whether the school roof is repaired, not simply which party a resident supports. People can see the school; they should also be able to see how its budget is spent.The same principle applies to the fight against corruption.
The key question is not only how many cases end in conviction, but how cases are selected, investigated and resolved. The Anti-Corruption Commission is established by law as an institution with investigative and prosecutorial functions.
Under the Anti-Corruption Act, the President has a role in appointing the Commissioner, while removal is restricted by statutory safeguards and a tribunal process; it is therefore inaccurate to suggest that the Commissioner can simply be removed at will. The law was also amended in 2019 to provide for out-of-court settlements in specified circumstances.
Those powers and safeguards deserve transparent scrutiny, including clear public reporting on the cases pursued, discontinued, charged and settled.Institutional independence must be credible as well as formal.
Where senior officials have visible political relationships or later seek political office, the public may reasonably ask whether an anti-corruption institution can act impartially. Such questions should be addressed through verifiable evidence, disclosure and robust safeguards—not insinuation.
Any specific claim about former commissioners’ political roles, the sitting Commissioner’s political intentions, or personal relationships involving public officials should be supported by reliable primary documentation and offered to the people concerned for response before publication.
The public interest lies in ensuring that the office responsible for investigating corruption is trusted across party lines.District councils should not be expected to police themselves. Local accountability must be supported by a national anti-corruption system designed to prevent political or personal influence over individual cases.
Possible reforms include a transparent, independent nomination process for the Commissioner; parliamentary confirmation by a clearly defined supermajority; a single, non-renewable term; removal only for stated cause established through a fair tribunal process; secure and transparent funding; and public reporting on cases opened, discontinued, charged and concluded.
Investigators could be deployed across districts under national recruitment, supervision and rotation arrangements, reducing the risk that those auditing a local budget are personally beholden to the people who prepared it.
These are policy proposals for debate, not a description of the law as it currently stands.None of this requires Sierra Leone to lower its ambitions. A national jobs programme could employ Sierra Leoneans to build infrastructure and deliver services their communities need.
Foreign investment can contribute to development, but it cannot substitute for a domestic strategy that connects local production, jobs, markets and public infrastructure.
There are reasonable objections to devolution. Local councils may lack capacity. That is an argument for sequencing reform, not abandoning it.
Transfer functions in stages, tie funding to audited results, and invest in training and systems before and during the transition. Capacity is developed by taking on responsibility with proper support—not by postponing responsibility indefinitely.Another concern is that decentralisation could create thirteen or more local centres of abuse.
Local capture is a real risk. But local budgets and results can be compared across districts, and residents are closer to the services and officials they depend on.
The answer is not to assume that local government will be virtuous; it is to design oversight, audits, disclosure and citizen participation into the system from the beginning.Devolution could also deepen inequality.
Kono has mineral resources; Freetown has a larger concentration of economic activity and revenue opportunities, while districts such as Falaba and Koinadugu have different needs and revenue bases. A legally established transfer formula must therefore precede any major shift in responsibilities.
It should account for population, poverty, service-delivery gaps and the cost of providing services, and it should not be altered at the discretion of individual ministers.Finally, constitutional and political obstacles are real.
The Constitution (Amendment) Bill, 2025 was passed by Parliament on 10 August 2026 amid a dispute over whether the required two-thirds threshold or a simple majority applied.
The matter is now before the Supreme Court. As of 15 October 2026, published reports indicate that the Court’s proceedings were continuing; the legal questions remain for the Court to determine. This article does not seek to prejudge that case. The broader point is that major institutional reform requires lawful process, public legitimacy and sustained civic demand.
Some administrative changes may be possible under existing law, but each proposed transfer of powers, staffing and funding must be checked against the Constitution and relevant statutes.
Pilot programmes in a small number of districts could help demonstrate what works, subject to legal authority and transparent evaluation.For sixty-five years, Sierra Leone has repeatedly changed the occupants of the state without fully resolving how power and public resources are distributed.
The next election alone will not repair a school in Kailahun. Giving communities meaningful authority, funding and accountability may bring that decision closer to the people who live with its consequences.About the AuthorKelfala Lebbie is a Sierra Leonean who has worked in international development for more than a decade, focusing on governance and public-sector reform.Editorial note: This is an opinion article. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position of Spear News Sierra Leone.